Warning: Illegal string offset 'font_awesome' in /home/webadmin/websites/competitionpolicyinternational.com/releases/20190905/wp-content/plugins/td-composer/includes/tdc_main.php on line 413

Notice: Array to string conversion in /home/webadmin/websites/competitionpolicyinternational.com/releases/20190905/wp-content/plugins/td-composer/includes/tdc_main.php on line 413
[rev_slider_vc alias=”podcast”]

CPI PODCAST: Episode 42

Modernizing the Vertical Merger Guidelines By Steven C. Salop

In this short article, I highlight some key issues in formulating revised guidelines and legal standards for vertical mergers that several co-authors and I have analyzed in recent articles. These are distilled into five principles. These principles flow from a recognition that the harms and benefits from horizontal and vertical mergers in oligopoly markets are similar, that cognizable vertical merger efficiencies are not inevitable, and that the Section 7 incipiency standard places weight on false negatives. Agencies should evaluate vertical merger efficiency claims as critically as they do for horizontal mergers and should require the merging parties to show that any efficiencies (including EDM) are verifiable, merger-specific and sufficient to reverse the potential anticompetitive effects. The agencies should limit safe harbors and consider a number of anticompetitive presumptions.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 41

Lessons from AT&T/Time Warner By Dennis W. Carlton, Mark A. Israel & Allan L. Shampine

AT&T/Time Warner is the U.S. Department of Justice’s first vertical merger challenge in decades. The merging parties hired us initially to provide economic analyses of the antitrust issues raised by the merger and ultimately to assist with and testify in the litigation. There are three keys lessons that we draw from the outcome of the litigation for future antitrust practice.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 40

EU Competition Arbitration: A Reliable Forum for Private Enforcement By Dr. Gordon Blanke

Over the past twenty to twenty-five years, arbitration has developed into a reliable forum for the private enforcement of EU competition law claims. Following the CJEU’s seminal ruling in Eco Swiss, competition arbitrability has become a fait accompli across the majority of EU Member State jurisdictions. The adoption of Regulation 1/2003, the EU Damages Directive and the Commission Notice on Remedies have all, to some extent, promoted the arbitration of competition law and more specifically the private enforcement of the EU competition law rules through arbitration.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 39

Ohio v. American Express: Assessing the Threat to Antitrust Enforcement By Michael L. Katz

One year later, the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Ohio v. American Express remains a glaring example of the misapplication of economic theory coupled with disregard for the factual record. If applied to other cases, the approach to antitrust analysis stated in that opinion would threaten sound enforcement. In this note, I assess the breadth and likelihood of that threat. I observe that a wide variety of firms could fall under the Court’s definition of a transaction platform and, thus, be candidates for application of the American Express approach. However, in recently decided Apple v. Pepper, neither the majority opinion nor the dissent applied the American Express approach despite the fact that Apple App Store clearly is a transaction platform.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 38

Penn State Hershey: A Cautionary Tale for Antitrust Litigators By Margaux Poueymirou

This article addresses a recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 914 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2019), upholding the denial of attorneys’ fees to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in an action filed by Pennsylvania and the Federal Trade Commission to enjoin the proposed merger of two major Pennsylvania hospital systems, on the grounds that it would substantially lessen competition for general acute care inpatient hospital services in the four-county area surrounding Harrisburg. It examines the clash between the district court and Third Circuit’s interpretation of what it means to “substantially prevail” under Section 16 of the Clayton Act and concludes by arguing that in joint actions brought by the Commission and State Attorneys General, it is now particularly incumbent on the latter to litigate under the more demanding Clayton Act standard for granting injunctive relief in order to protect future attorneys’ fee awards.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 37

Not So Fast, You Still Have to Define the Relevant Market: The Less Debated Yet Vital Teaching of Ohio v. American Express By Elai Katzl

Most discussions of Ohio v. America Express focus on two-sided markets. This article will not. Instead, the article analyzes the Court’s ruling that plaintiffs cannot evade defining the relevant market when challenging vertical restraints (and arguably other practices subject to the rule-of-reason). In holding that courts must first define the relevant market before assessing evidence of anticompetitive effects in rule-of-reason cases, the majority resisted efforts to relax the market definition requirement, which has been advocated by scholars and litigants in recent years. Instead, the Court reaffirmed the centrality of relevant market definition, which has been a fundamental feature of antitrust jurisprudence for nearly a century.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 36

Much Ado About Amex By Keith N. Hylton

Ohio v. Amex has gained a great deal of attention because of its implications for digital platforms. The decision, though harshly criticized by many commentators, does not presage major changes in antitrust enforcement. Amex is likely to have a limited impact on antitrust law and enforcement. The reason Amex has a limited reach is that it is mostly a response to the plaintiffs’ proof of market power using direct (pricing) evidence. Amex should be understood as a statement about the direct evidence approach to proving or inferring market power. Under Amex, in cases involving two-sided markets where plaintiffs present such direct evidence, courts must conduct market power analyses with a view toward both sides of the market.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 35

Common Ownership and Antitrust: Eight Critical Points to Guide Antitrust Policy By Menesh S. Patel

This article presents eight critical points that can aid the ongoing and early development of antitrust policy relating to common ownership. These points touch on some of the most salient issues concerning the relationship between common ownership and competitive harm and have important implications on how regulators should craft antitrust policy as it relates to common ownership. The article’s eight points collectively show that rather than per se prohibitions, safe harbors, or wide-scale investigations, regulators should evaluate the competitive effects of common ownership on a case-by-case basis, just as they currently evaluate other potential sources of competitive harm.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 34

Competition and Common Ownership – A Governance Perspective By Holly J. Gregory

This article considers the potential anticompetitive effects of common ownership by institutional investors in concentrated industries from a corporate governance perspective and questions the hypothesis that companies in concentrated industries are pressed by institutional investors into anti-competitive conduct. It concludes that restricting institutional investor investment and related governance engagement would have broad implications outside the antitrust policy sphere that deserve careful consideration.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 33

Navigating the Backwater: Vertical Mergers in Health Care By Thomas L. Greaney

Antitrust enforcers are taking a second look at vertical mergers as a large body of theoretical and empirical work has undermined the economic foundations of the laissez-faire approach that has characterized government policies over the last thirty years. Health care markets, which exhibit many of the key pre-conditions for harm from vertical mergers, are experiencing rapid consolidation. This essay suggests that continued forbearance will result in consumer harm and close attention should be paid to vertical combinations involving the providers, payors, and middlemen.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 32

Online Advertising and Antitrust: Network Effects, Switching Costs, and Data as an Essential Facility By Catherine E. Tucker

In this paper, I discuss some of the traditional sources of market power grounded in economics, and how they apply to online advertising markets. I discuss the idea that digital advertising has evolved technologies that are intended to dismantle many early network effects in online advertising. I then discuss how new digital technologies have evolved to reduce switching costs for advertisers. Last, I discuss briefly the question of whether data can be thought of as an essential facility for advertising.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 31

Advertising as Monopolization in the Information Age By Ramsi A. Woodcock

Economists have long recognized that advertising has two main functions: To inform and to persuade. In the information age, the information function is obsolete, because consumers can get all the product information they want from a quick Google search. That makes virtually all advertising today purely persuasive in function. The courts have long recognized that purely persuasive advertising is anticompetitive, because it induces consumers to buy products that they do not really prefer, harming consumers and placing sellers of consumers’ preferred products at a competitive disadvantage.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 30

Fighting Supplier Collusion in Public Procurement: Some Proposals for Strengthening Competition Law Enforcement By Alison Jones & William E. Kovacic

Governments around the world spend an estimated $9.5 trillion of public money purchasing vital goods and services each year. The nature of public procurement systems, however, makes them prone to distortion through supplier collusion (collusive tendering or bid rigging). Where it occurs, unlawful collusive tendering is liable to result in prices for these essential goods and services rising, and their quantity and quality reducing. It thus results in significant detriment to the taxpayer and citizens’ welfare, threatens growth, development and social welfare and reduces confidence in public institutions and public procurement processes.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 29

With Increased Powers to National Competition Authorities in the EU, Will We have Appropriate By Kaarli H. Eichhorn

Following the recent adoption of the EU’s “ECN+ Directive,” this article highlights the importance of the rule of law in the EU, including in competition proceedings. It applauds the Directive’s many improvements to enhancing national competition enforcement, and contends that due process issues should have received more attention, in parallel with the substantially increased powers given to EU Member State competition authorities. This article finds that a genuinely effective competition regime can only be attained with robust procedural safeguards to accompany the greater powers that competition agencies across Europe will exercise in the future.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 28

Abuse of a Dominant Position: A Post-Intel Calm? By Giorgio Monti

While the Intel judgment might be a watershed moment for the ECJ’s interpretation of Article 102 TFEU, there may be risks that this development is countered by two trends: first, a concern by some competition agencies that a more aggressive approach is required to counter firms with exorbitant market power; second, a retreat to formalism by competition agencies who find the effects-based approach too problematic to implement. Moreover, for a proper integration of an effects-based approach, agencies focusing on prohibiting likely anticompetitive effects could develop improved approaches to the design of remedies and the measurement of fines.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 27

This is Not an Article on Data Protection and Competition Law By Giovanni Buttarelli

Privacy, data protection, and competition law originate from the same creative energy. They concern the protection of those realms allowing human beings to meaningfully exercise their rights and freedoms. The FCO’s decision on Facebook marks an important step in looking at data protection as a benchmark for competition enforcement. The osmosis of policy goals mean that authorities are keen to adjust their tools to reality and modernize their response to a world in continuous transition. However, the analysis should move on from being only focused on data, as much more is at stake in the digital ecosystem. The “holy grail” of tech giants brokerage is our entire existence, which leads to legitimate concerns of a possible vulnus to our democracies at large. Authorities should accelerate their cooperation and mutual support in order to effectively guarantee freedoms and rights of people living the digital age.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 26

Privacy and Competition: Friends, Foes, or Frenemies? By Maureen K. Ohlhausen

he debate about data-rich tech companies has led to calls for changes to consumer privacy law, competition law, or both. Europe has adopted the General Data Protection Regulation, limiting the collection, use, and sharing of consumer data, which may raise competitive hurdles for some players. It also includes a data portability requirement, which may reduce lock-in and spur competition. Some have also advocated using competition law to impose new controls and obligations on entities that collect consumer data. U.S. antitrust law has considered data about and generated by consumers in merger cases and has even imposed data sharing as a remedy. There are calls to go further and treat consumer data as an essential facility and force big tech companies to share it. The essential facilities theory is in tension with the premises behind new privacy laws, which are that there is an abundance of consumer data and that consumers want less, not more, sharing of their data. This article explores the challenges and limits to these theories and the tension they create between reducing and widening access to consumer data. Can privacy and competition values live in harmony as friends, will some of these proposals make them enemies, or is it a bit of both?

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 25

Discovering New Spheres of Antitrust Damages Quantification By Hans-Petter H. Hanson & Johannes Holzwarth

Private enforcement of EU competition law is picking up but still a relatively new phenomenon. When developing private enforcement, the EU lawmakers could benefit from experiences in other jurisdictions, such as the United States. However, in relation to awarding damages for antitrust infringements, the European path seems quite different. Particularly since it is compensatory in nature, private enforcement of EU competition law supports the concept of passing-on of overcharges. By reference to the applicable rules and the upcoming guidelines of the European Commission, this article discusses selected issues in relation to passing-on, such the scope of the relevant presumptions and the courts’ power to estimate as well as the potential difference between legal and economic causation.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 24

The EU Google Decisions: Extreme Enforcement or the Tip of The Behavioral Iceberg? By Amelia Fletcher

The recent EU Google decisions may represent a high-water mark for the use of behavioral economics in EU antitrust to date, but what do they imply for competition policy in the future? Do such cases represent the outer extremes of how far behavioral thinking can and should be taken? Or do they represent baby steps towards the more comprehensive incorporation of behavioral economics into competition policy thinking? This article highlights the widespread influence of behavioral economics across other areas of policy and discusses a number of directions in which competition policy could potentially be transformed. Noting the existence of an extensive literature in behavioral antitrust, it focuses on a number of aspects which have been given less attention to date.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 23

“Leniency Plus” and its Potential Minuses By Tara L. Reinhart

Many companies avail themselves of the Antitrust Division’s “leniency plus” policy. Leniency plus allows companies pleading guilty to price- xing of one product to receive a signi cantly reduced ne if, at the same time, they obtain leniency for reporting illegal conduct related to one or more additional prod- ucts. The bene ts are signi cant, but companies taking advantage of leniency plus also face risks. First, the burdens of cooperation can be immense, and companies must be prepared to pay signi cant time and expense. Second, companies must do what they can to avoid “penalty plus.” Finally, the reality that employees often will obtain leniency for price- xing of some products but face prosecution for others greatly complicates the company’s efforts. This article explores those risks.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 22

Google Android Antitrust: Dominance Pivots and a Business Model Clash in Brussels By Randal Picker

The European Commission’s recent action against Google regarding the licensing terms for Android appears to undervalue results of the business model competition that has taken place in smartphone operating systems. Apple, Microsoft, and Google entered the smartphone market with different approaches: Apple vertically integrated software and hardware; Google went two-sided; and Microsoft offered fee licenses. Two of those approaches have succeeded and one has failed, but the great irony of the situation is that now that consumers have spoken, the EC seems to be pushing Google to undertake a dominance pivot and to switch to a business model that consumers rejected.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 21

The European Commission’s Android Decision and Broader Lessons for Article 102 Enforcement By Nicholas Banasevic

Against the backdrop of the ongoing debate about the appropriate role for competition policy in hi-tech markets and the suitability of its analytical tools, this article examines some of the key findings of the European Commission’s July 2018 Android Decision. While it is important to delineate between what issues should be dealt with by competition law and what might be for other areas of policy, the Decision illustrates that the tools of competition law are sufficiently flexible to be able to analyse conduct in hi-tech markets in a meaningful way.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 20


Competition agency process can be just as important as substance when it comes to effective enforcement. Over the past decade, the scrutiny of agency process has led to the identification and promotion of consensus principles for the provision of procedural fairness during competition investigations at the OECD, ICN, and elsewhere. But a consensus on high-level principles may mean little without a commitment to embed fairness into the day-to-day practices and choices that guide agency investigations and decision making, and ultimately affect enforcement outcomes. This article explores the developing consensus around procedural fairness principles and practices and suggests possible ways for more progress.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 19


Convergence in practice on due process principles is critical to the evolution of international antitrust. While international intergovernmental and private organizations have long promoted best practice and guidance documents on due process principles, more remains to be done. The Department of Justice recently announced the Multilateral Framework on Procedures in Competition Law Investigation and Enforcement (“MFP”). Unlike previous efforts, the MFP contemplates a mechanism for accountability with respect to participants’ adherence to issued guidance, which evokes a promise for evolution of adherence to and implementation of basic due process standards. If the MFP can shine a light on the extent to which nations implement due process norms, the new direction in which it may take the international antitrust community is an important and salutary development.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 18


Innovation is an important concern for merger policy in high technology industries. While the antitrust laws are sufficiently flexible to address issues in the R&D-intensive sectors of the economy, there are several practical obstacles to effective antitrust enforcement for innovation. These include: (i) limited economic theory and empirical evidence relating mergers to innovation effects; (ii) the historical importance of market definition in merger analysis; (iii) the standard of proof to establish antitrust harm; (iv) the treatment of efficiencies and appropriability; and (v) limited evidence on the effectiveness of merger remedies to restore innovation incentives.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 17

TWO-SIDED RED HERRINGS – AUDIO By David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee

A surprising amount of debate leading up to the Supreme Court’s decision in American Express, and the commentary following this landmark ruling, attempt to trivialize and marginalize the modern economic learning on multisided platforms. Despite these efforts the 2ndCircuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court ultimately embraced the economic literature on these business models. This article debunks five red herrings that have been floated in the debate: (1) the two sides are just complements, nothing new there; (2) everything is two-sided, or who’s to know what’s two-sided; (3) as industries mature two-sidedness goes away; (4) markets must be one sided since the services to the two sides aren’t interchangeable; and (5) two-sided analysis “devastates” antitrust law. The Supreme Court’s decision has raised a host of interesting issues, including how to deal with two-sided platform businesses that look different from American Express’s credit-card platform and what sort of evidence is necessary or sufficient in markets with platform businesses to establish competitive effects. Like any Supreme Court decision, not every word was chosen as carefully as it might have been, and clarifications will be needed going forward. The large and evolving literature on two-sided platforms will prove helpful to sort that out and we anticipate that the courts will embrace this constructive approach.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 16


Twenty years after the emergence of platform literature antitrust courts and authorities still face formidable challenges in deciphering platform business models. The latest two Google cases (Google Search, Google Android) highlight the schism between what firms consider an innovative business plan and what the law is ready to accept. Noting the schism, this article focuses on a number of points that European competition law needs to address to better reconcile business practice with antitrust legal analysis with the view to enable successful firms to operate without fear of punitive enforcement.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 15


Many of the largest and most successful businesses today rely on providing service at no charge to at least a portion of their users. Free services often delight users, yet also create a series of challenges for competition policy, including impeding entry, inviting overproduction on quality, and increasing the risk of deception and overpayment. This short paper presents these problems, examines the strategies that entrants can attempt when competing with free service, and considers possible regulatory responses.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 14


The U.S. District Court’s opinion unconditionally approving AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner is often mistakenly regarded as the mere application of settled law to a particular case. A close reading of the decision yields insights in five areas: (1) what constitutes must-have content; (2) the importance of focusing exclusively on merger-specific harms; (3) the importance of showing both the ability and the incentive to harm competition; (4) the increasing importance of empirical analysis; and (5) the problems with dual-agency review. As such, analysis of the District Court opinion will continue to provide key lessons even if it is superseded on appeal.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 13


Vertical transactions were for a long time a neglected area of merger control. However, with recent changes in the economy and economic theory, competition authorities are rediscovering vertical merger enforcement. This article examines the European Commission’s approach to vertical mergers and the academic and policy debate relating to vertical merger control. It then offers practical suggestions for competition authorities grappling with these issues.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 12


Price parity clauses have recently triggered several antitrust investigations. Although decisions in similar markets have sometimes been conflicting, the agencies tend to rely on the same theory of harm. In this paper, I revisit the recent economic (theoretical and empirical) literature which allows me to identify some of the crucial factors that may lead to anticompetitive effects of such clauses: price parity clauses are more likely to be harmful when suppliers cannot credibly threaten platforms to stop using them in case commissions are seen as excessive. This will occur for instance when the diversion from intermediation platforms to the suppliers’ direct sales channel (e.g. own website) is weak.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 11

INNOVATION AND U.S. PATENT LAW By Paul R. Michel & Matthew J. Dowd

Because the strength of patent rights gauges the incentive to invest, America’s future is threatened by the weakening of those rights. Starting in 2006 and continuing to today, excessive and uncoordinated incursions by the Supreme Court, the Congress and the patent office have enfeebled patent rights. The American Patent System, previously the best in the world, but now ranked 12th, is failing, patenting is being avoided by many, and investments are now flowing away from inventive start-ups and away from America to more secure opportunities elsewhere. Halting this decline has become a national priority. But to revive patents, we must first understand how and why the system was gutted.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 10


In this brief note we explore some of the potential for modern “machine learning” methods to aid in the detection, and therefore defense, of collusive arrangements. We argue that where and when the problem can be formed as one of classification or prediction – are the observed prices during this period well-explained by an algorithm which does explain prices in another period? – machine learning algorithms may be useful supplementary tools. But we also argue that the analysis of collusion rarely ends with such questions. When we need to test a hypothesis, the statistical properties of more traditional econometric methods are likely still required.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 9


Last year, the District Court for the District of Utah held that the rule of reason governed a criminal antitrust prosecution by the Department of Justice, filed against a company that allocated customers with a competitor. This trial level ruling is on appeal to the Tenth Circuit. The Court of Appeals’ decision could significantly affect both criminal and civil antitrust actions. This article addresses the pending case and appeal, and also discusses other recent DOJ enforcement actions, which the DOJ has filed as civil, rather than criminal, Sherman Act violations. The article further addresses whether these recent DOJ cases may be diluting the message that per se treatment has, traditionally, conveyed.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 8


The importance of intellectual property (“IP”) and its role in promoting economic growth and consumer welfare have long been recognized in the U.S. Despite the risks involved in tampering with a system that has benefitted this country, some U.S. Government agencies have in recent years been anything but careful in their approach to IP issues. Abandoning antitrust law’s historical deference to the exercise of core IP rights, authorities have taken to using antitrust enforcement to favor IP users over innovators and to reduce the value of IP, threatening innovation incentives.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 7


In this article, Philip Lowe assesses the progress made so far in promoting international convergence in antitrust law and practice. Considerable efforts have been made to reach consensus between jurisdictions, both on substance and process. The OECD and the International Competition Network have played an important role in this.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 6


Labor platforms like Uber have mostly escaped antitrust scrutiny, despite the apparent legal risk that, by coordinating pricing among tens of thousands of “independent contractors,” they might run afoul of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. On the other hand, the enforcement agencies have indicated that collective bargaining by those contractors against the platform does trigger liability under Section 1.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 5


The EUCJ Intel decision is a reminder that European competition law looks different from that of the North American jurisdictions where economic effects drive enforcement policy and a tradition of due process and procedural fairness exists. Intel suggests limits to DG Competition’s enforcement with regard to due process and is a wake-up call for DG Competition to reiterate its commitment to procedural fairness.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 4


Why should we use antitrust law as a wealth distribution device when far more explicit statutory tools are available for that purpose? One feature of antitrust is its open-textured, nonspecific statutes, so using antitrust to redistribute wealth may be a way of invoking the judicial process without having to go to Congress or a state legislature. The most defensible goal for the antitrust laws is prohibition of practices that serve to reduce output anticompetitively, which is simply a statement of the consumer welfare principle. Accepting that competitive markets are conducive to greater wealth equality, hasn’t antitrust already done all it can do?

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 3


The “Neo-Brandeisian” school is challenging the prevailing consensus that antitrust law should primarily seek to advance consumer welfare. This brief essay poses four critical questions to the Neo-Brandeisians: (1) why throw out the baby with the bath water; (2) is the problem bigness or market power; (3) what principle should resolve the inevitable trade-offs between consumers and other interests; and (4) is bigness a curse in industry only, or also in government?

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 2


An interview with Massimo Motta on the topic of Online Platforms and antitrust. Massimo Motta is ICREA Research Professor at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics Research Professor and former Chief Competition Economist at the European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition.

Listen Here

CPI PODCAST: Episode 1


The ECJ’s recent move to classify Uber as a transportation-services company attracted international headlines-yet it was a fairly straightforward, commom-sense decision. What, then, made it so remarkable? It was one of the first high-level rejections of Silicon Valley Rhetoric. Tech giants are unrivaled in their ability to disguise who they are and what they do.

Listen Here

Read the CPI Chronicle